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In Senegal mutual health organizations (MHOs) have been present in the greater region of Thiès 
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insurance  literacy  module,  communicating  the  benefits  from  health  microinsurance  and  the 
functioning of MHOs, to a randomly selected sample of households in the city of Thiès. The 
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randomized control trial. We find that the insurance literacy module has no impact, but that our 
marketing treatment has a significant effect on the take up decisions of households.  
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Poor people in developing countries face expensive costs when accessing health care and need to 
insure  themselves  against  these  costs.  However,  given  that  formal  health  insurance  is 
prohibitively expensive, they must often, with qualified success, use informal ways of insuring 
themselves (see among others Makinen et al. 2000, Fafchamps et al. 2003). The imperfect nature 
of this informal insurance entails severe consequences for their aptitudes in dealing with risk, 
smoothing their consumption and the formation of human capital. Indeed, health shocks lead to 
direct expenditures for medicine and treatment, which typically require out-of-pocket payments 
(OOP), but also entail indirect costs related to a reduction in  productivity. One WHO study 
(WHO; 2007) estimates that OOP payments can often exceed 50% of total health care spending 
in some low-income countries and particularly for some African countries, where national health 
systems are still nascent at best and private health insurance is owned by only a small proportion 
of the population. In Senegal, recent figures indicate that OOP payments account for 44% of 
total health expenditures (Scheil-Adlung 2006). It has been shown that the cost of major illness 
has severe consequences on consumption, assets and human capital accumulation (Gertler et al. 
2002).  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  more  vulnerable  categories  such  as  workers  in  the 
informal sector and rural population (Morrisson, 2002).  
 
Public health funding in Senegal has been stable over recent years while overall per capita health 
expenditures have been increasing in the same period (World Bank, WDI). The shrinking of the 
state’s ability to meet health care needs makes it unable to provide universal insurance for its 
population. This has led to the emergence of many community-based health insurance schemes 
(CBHIS)  in  Senegal. At the same time, the market  has  been ineffective in  providing health 
insurance to low-income people even in urban environments. Private insurers are often faced 
with important adverse selection problems and high transaction costs. The costs of their contracts 
are often prohibitive. Poor people can thus only resort to punctual transfers from relatives or 
health insurance schemes rooted in local organizations. CBHIS are now at the core of health 
protection and universal coverage strategies and policies in many African countries (Diop et al. 
2006).  They  offer  a  form  of  insurance  which  allows  members  to  pay  regular  affordable 
premiums to reduce OOP payments for healthcare upon falling sick.  These schemes vary in 
design  and  implementation  but  they  are  all  not  for-profit  organizations  based  on  voluntary 
participation and underpinned by concepts of mutual aid and social solidarity at the community 
level.  
 
The literature analysing the factors influencing demand for such CBHIS, based on household 
data, has been burgeoning in recent years and Jütting (2003), Berthelet (2005), Smith et al. (2008) 
and Ito and Kano (2010) represent just a few empirical studies in developing countries. Our 
project  aims  to  complement  this  literature  by  incorporating  randomized  control  trials  of  the 
impact of insurance literacy and marketing options on the demand for health insurance from 
households. 
 
The  pilot  project  of  1990  in  the  village  of  Fandene  (in  the  vicinity  of  Thiès),  spurred  the 
expansion of CBHIS in the region and at the national level (Jütting, 2003). CBHIS are locally 3 
 
known as ‘mutuelles de santé’ or mutual health organizations (MHO). The number of MHOs in 
Senegal grew from 13 in 1993 to more than 140 in 2007. Despite this growth, the overall take-up 
rate in 2004 in the region of Thiès was around 5% (Smith et al. 2008). A figure corroborated by a 
recent study in Lépine et al. (2010). This was confirmed during our pilot study in Thiès city 
where  we  carried  out  informal  interviews  with  more  than  a  hundred  randomly  selected 
households. Results from this preliminary phase showed that although MHOs have been active 
for a relatively long time in the region, around eight out of ten city inhabitants were unaware of 
their existence. This is undoubtedly a factor in explaining low take up rates.  
 
Recent studies have used randomized control trials to look at the role of financial literacy and 
marketing on rainfall insurance product uptake (Cole et al., 2009 and Gaurav et al., 2009). The 
main contribution of this paper is that it is one of a few to investigate the roles these have on the 
uptake of health microinsurance (Thornton et al. 2010, Dercon et al. 2011). In particular, we 
investigate the roles of lack of knowledge of these MHOs, and lack of financial literacy amongst 
locals. We also investigate the effect of marketing techniques that alleviate the potential financial 
barriers to entry. This paper reports on a series of marketing experiments conducted in the city of 
Thiès  designed  to  test  the  financial  and  behavioural  constraints  to  the  purchase  of  health 
microinsurance. We surveyed 360 randomly selected households across the city and from this 
half  of  the  sample  was  offered  an  insurance  literacy  training  program.  Independent  of  this 
assignment,  all  360  households  were  randomly  selected  to  receive  one  of  three  marketing 
treatments. These treatments took the form of redeemable vouchers offering different monetary 
compensations upon joining an MHO. These vouchers are described in greater detail below. Our 
results tend to show that our insurance literacy module has no significant impact on the uptake 
whereas our marketing treatment strongly and positively influences the uptake. 
 
The next section elaborates on various reasons explaining low take-up rates in the context of our 
study. Section 3 presents the supply side of health microinsurance in Thiès. Section 4 describes 
our survey and offers descriptive statistics and is followed by a presentation of the study design 
in Section 5. We then move on to introduce our empirical strategy in Section 6 and discuss our 
results in Section 7. 
 
2. EXPLAINING LOW TAKE-UP RATES 
 
Our sample of 360 heads  of households shows that 32% of them have health insurance, of 
various forms, for all or a fraction of their members (on average 73% of all household members). 
The  largest  share  (19%)  represents  households  which  have  health  insurance  compulsorily 
provided  by  their  employer  in  both  public  and  private  sectors.  Only  3%  of  the  households 
subscribe to a private health insurer while membership in MHOs remains relatively modest at 
10%. The next section elaborates on each of these health microinsurance products. 
 
Such low take-up rates of health insurance are expected to have effects on the use of health 
facilities. Scheil-Adlung et al. (2006), referring to Senegal, report that most people (85%) in the 
poorest income quintile state that economic constraints are the main reason for not seeking care, 
while unavailability of health services and facilities is secondary. This may at least partly explain 
why health providers using modern medical means often compete against the relatively cheaper 
services provided by traditional healers (marabou). Indeed, 45% of respondents in our sample 4 
 
declared to consult traditional healers (but non-exclusively) for minor health problems such as 
headaches, stomach ache or toothache. Conversely, a little over 55% declared to make use of 
modern medicine only. There appears to be an overall willingness to use modern means on the 
part of the heads of households as they are widely perceived as more efficient. To the question: 
‘in case of health problem related to malaria in your household, how much are you likely, out of 
ten, to use the services of a traditional healer?’, only 11% gave 6 or more as an answer. Despite 
this, and the relatively high costs of modern medical means, we find a low MHO take up rate. In 
our sample, the justifications mentioned for lack of membership to MHOs were linked to the 
following: lack of information about the product they offer and their existence (70% of cases); 
lack of financial means (16%); lack of interest (5%); and lack of trust and confidence (2%). Our 
investigation focuses on what appears to be the two important reasons at play, in our context, in 
explaining low take-up rates. Our cross-cutting treatments (discussed in detail in Section 5) are 
designed and implemented accordingly. 
 
(a) Lack of information 
 
Cai et al. (2009) highlight that many farmers in China refuse to purchase heavily subsidized 
insurance, and that this might be due to the fact that not all farmers are aware of the insurance 
program. Jutting (2003), whose evidence is drawn from a rural region surrounding Thiès, states 
that the concept of insurance is alien to a large proportion of people. He also notes that an 
information campaign would probably be useful in this respect. Related to this is the lack of 
knowledge  and  understanding  of  insurance  principles  (Chankova  et  al.  2008).  Referring  to 
rainfall insurance in India, Giné et al. (2007) report that ‘the most common reason given by those 
interviewed was that they did not understand the product’. Limited understanding of rainfall 
insurance mechanisms in rural India is also highlighted by Cole et al. (2009) and Gaurav et al. 
(2009). Pratt et al. (2010) show similar evidence with their sample of observations on Ethiopian 
and Malawi farmers.  
 
(b) Lack of Means 
 
Whether poor populations can afford microinsurance schemes is a crucial question. Jutting (2003) 
finds that the poorer segment of the population is represented to a lesser extent than people with 
an average or high income in MHOs. Chankova et al. (2008) find similar results using data from 
Ghana, Mali and Senegal. Giné et al. (2008) also show that take-up rate of rainfall insurance 
increases with household wealth in rural Andhra Pradesh. Cole et al. (2009) explain low take-up 
rates of rainfall insurance by, among others, the fact that the insurance is expensive.  
 
In our case, the fact that lack of means is mentioned by only 16% of individuals as the reason for 
their non-membership does not come as much of a surprise if we compare their willingness to 
pay (WTP) to the actual premiums imposed by MHOs. Based on the same dataset used for this 
paper,  Bonan  (2011)  uses  the  contingency  valuation  method  to  measure  the  uninsured 
respondents’ WTP for  MHOs’ premiums, and for how many individuals they are willing to 
insure inside their household at that price. With an average of about 300FCFA, WTP is similar to 
the average premiums of a subset of prevailing MHOs for which we have information.  
 
(c) Lack of Trust 5 
 
 
Trust can also play an important role in individual insurance decision-making. Cai et al (2009) 
show that very low take-up of insurance for sows by Chinese farmers which is sponsored by the 
government may be explained, among other reasons, by the lack of trust toward governmental 
institutions. Cole et al. (2009) show that endorsement from a third party make people 40% more 
likely to purchase rainfall insurance. Dercon et al. (2011) suggest that limited credibility of the 
insurer contributes to reduce the demand for insurance.  
 
Trust is likely to play an important role in the sustainability of MHOs and in their capacity to 
attract new members. Recent history in Thiès has shown that some rare MHOs have ceased their 
activities or been temporarily unable to provide their members with insurance (Ferrera-Domingo 
2002 lists some cases of defaulting MHOs). As claimed by Karlan (2005), answers on trust in 
General Social Surveys have predictive power on financial decisions at household level, such as 
repayment rates and saving patterns, and are a good proxy of capacity to enter into binding 
relationships. We included two questions in our questionnaire related to this issue. We asked 
individuals to weight their trust on different items by putting aside marbles out of a maximum of 
ten on an increasing scale. We rescaled each answer respectively with respect to the trust given 
in the mother and in the family. For the sample of non-members aware of the existence of MHOs 
we find that in both cases the median relative trust on MHOs given was eight out of ten. This 
tends to show that these grassroots movements benefit from a largely positive a priori from 
locals and appear as trustworthy. This might explain why trust does not seem to be an important 
factor in explaining the low take-up rates we observe. 
 
3. THE SUPPLY SIDE 
 
Health care in Thiès, a city located 60km to the east of the capital city of Dakar, is organised 
according to a tiered system consisting of health huts (staffed by community health workers), 
health posts (staffed by nurses and certified midwives), and health centres (staffed by medical 
doctors, nurses, and certified midwives). The health district of Thiès has one regional public 
hospital and one privately run mission hospital (St-Jean de Dieu). Data for this region shows that 
the ratio of inhabitants to health centres is seven times greater than WHO standards, while the 
ratio of inhabitants to health posts is in line with international norms (ANSD, 2008).  
 
As mentioned above, in the absence of universal public health care
1, only three forms of health 
insurance are present in our sample. The first, and of relatively little importance, is offered by 
private insurers. They provide insurance according to different scales and often require their 
clients to open a saving account within their own institution (PAMECAS, SALAMA and Crédit 
Mutuel du Sénégal). The second type refers to compulsory insurance provided by employers of a 
minimal size (with a minimum number of employees). Employees are this way contributing a 
fraction of their wage to their firms’ health fund known as Institution de Prévoyance Maladie 
(IPM). This fund is then used to partially cover employees when health problems occur. Public 
servants have access to a more generous type of IPM where they, their spouse, and often up to 
two children (under 18), are partially insured in case of health related expenditures. The third 
type consists of MHOs. Their appeal lies in the fact that they require the payment of affordable 
monthly premiums, mostly ranging from 150 to 350 FCFA per  person covered.
2 MHOs are 
particularly attractive to the large numbers of self-employed and informal sector workers who 
are price discriminated by private insurers. The MHOs we surveyed declared not operating any 6 
 
selection amongst potential candidates. The only screening that is involved takes the form of a 
‘period  of  observation’  that  is  imposed  by  all  MHOs.  Once  new  members  have  paid  their 
membership fees they are asked to contribute for three months during which they are not entitled 
to any claim. This three-month period is there to minimise adverse selection by checking if new 
members can stick to a strict monthly schedule of contributions. Any arrears on premiums can 
lead an MHO to exclude a member from coverage. Rules are strict but the administrators of 
some MHOs have admitted allowing for some flexibility. These not-for-profit grassroot schemes 
are managed by a non remunerated governing body headed by a president and have written rules. 
Members are expected to pay their premiums with a monthly visit to the finance officer who 
occasionally organises a collection for members who are late in their payment. Upon entry, new 
members must pay fixed membership fees covering the costs of registering, which includes a 
booklet listing all household members being registered. This acts as an official document when 
visiting a health provider.  
 
The oldest MHO was founded in 1990 with the support of the St-Jean de Dieu hospital and aims 
at mainly covering inpatient care. Most schemes now cover primary care offered at health huts, 
posts and centres (Diop, 2005). Data from 2004 show that MHOs covered approximately 62000 
individuals or 4.8% of the whole region of Thiès population (Smith et al. 2008). The different 
MHOs  covering  the  city  are  relatively  well  spread  across  its  territory  so  that  most 
neighbourhoods have access to one. There is no obligation to join the closest MHO and one can 
opt for the MHO of one’s choice. Differences with respect to their insurance schemes are minor. 
For these reasons we consider distance to the headquarters of the closest MHO as unlikely to 
have explanatory power.  
 
Once  insured  by  one  of  the  three  schemes  described  above,  members  can  directly  access 
specified health facilities and are required to pay a fraction of the fees. The remainder of the fees 
are covered by the insurer. Such transactions have at their core agreements (or conventions) 
negotiated between each respective health provider (huts, posts or the two centres) and MHOs 
operating in Thiès. As such the agreement of the insurer, prior to a consultation or the treatment 
of a particular patient, is not required. The array of interventions covered and the extent of the 
coverage  varies  from  one  MHO  to  the  other.  However  they  generally  cover  25-75%  of 
consultation  costs  and  between  50-100%  of  medical  exams,  hospitalizations,  and  various 
inpatient cares fees at both the regional and St-Jean de Dieu hospitals.  
 
As IPMs do not offer full coverage for consultation and inpatient care fees, and do not cover all 
members of a household, there is ample scope to complement this coverage with that of an MHO. 
Twenty  one  households  (9%  of  the  all  households  exposed  to  the  marketing  treatment) 
responded  positively  to  our  marketing  treatment  even  if  they  already  had  a  form  of  health 
insurance (see section 6 for more details on this). This suggests the existing intention to either 
complement existing means of insurance or to cover additional members of the household or kin 
or both. In particular, out of those 21 households seven complemented an IPM insurance, 11 an 
existing MHO insurance and three another private form of health insurance.    
 
4. OUR SURVEY 
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In  early  2010  we  developed  a  partnership  with  GRAIM  (Groupe  recherche  d’appui  aux 
initiatives mutualistes) a Senegalese NGO promoting the work of local MHOs active in greater 
Thiès. GRAIM was initiated by the Ministry of Health and Prevention as part of the Ministry’s 
first  program  to  support  MHOs.  As  such,  GRAIM  acts  as  a  regional  coordinator  and  the 
intermediary for most MHOs in negotiating conventions with health providers. This partnership 
meant we could draw on its knowledge to design and deliver our educational modules, and on its 
staff to hire our team of enumerators. Thiès was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, it is the 
second most important city in Senegal with a population of about 240,000 inhabitants (2002 
census). Secondly, some of the local MHOs are the oldest in Senegal, having been active for 
fifteen years, and as such the city possesses a well established supply of MHOs.  
 
We use data we collected during the spring of 2010 on 360 randomly selected households across 
the whole territory covered by the city authorities, which represents an area of approximately 20 
km square. Our baseline survey aimed at obtaining information on each household member’s 
religion,  level  of  education  and  health  problems  (sickness  and  chronic  diseases).  We  also 
gathered information from the head of household concerning work, income, and a number of 
other factors pertaining to trust, risk aversion, and discount rate evaluation, which we describe 
below in greater detail. In the context of the households we surveyed, and this can safely be 
extended to the broader national level, the husband is generally considered to be the breadwinner 
and the head of household and as such is expected to insure the members of his household. This 
is why we collected these key variables affecting health insurance intake from the head. In what 
follows we therefore use data at the household level. 
 
HERE TABLE 1: whole sample information 
 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main socio-economic characteristics we consider in 
our study and which will be included in our specifications. Most of the heads of household are 
male and live in a couple. The average size of a household is more than six members. 46% of 
household heads attended secondary school or higher levels of education (above six years of 
schooling). Head’s income is used as a proxy for households’ economic conditions. It represents 
the sum of all sources of monthly income (labour income or wage, rent and received transfers). 
Due to the sensitivity of questions related to income, and the reticence to provide exact amounts, 
answers were in most cases (68% of all answers) collected according to intervals. An aggregated 
measure of income was constructed by adding intervals’ midpoint values for the ten income 
intervals or exact values when given to rents and transfers nominal values. We then categorized 
in quintiles. Another variable (household’s income) was similarly computed by adding spouse’s 
income. Our results do not change if we use this variable instead. We also computed a synthetic 
measure of durable assets owned by the households as proxy for wealth. It is simply the sum of a 
list of items comprising among others a series of kitchen and home appliances, mobile phone, 
bicycle,  motorcycle,  car,  sewing  machine,  different  pieces  of  furniture,  etc.  As  a  proxy  for 
income stability we use a dummy identifying if the head of households is working for a public 
institution or not. We also include a dummy for self-employed or not (the benchmark group are 
employed  by  private  firms).  The  intuition  is  that  with  respect  to  wage  earned  in  informal 
activities (petty retailing, craftsmen, transport, etc.), public servants are likely to have a steadier 
stream of revenues and find it easier to commit to the payment of monthly premiums. Around 
20% of heads  in  our sample  work  for the state. We also  measure with dummy variables  if 8 
 
households are using one of three saving devices: ROSCAs, banks or microfinance institutions. 
Having access to a saving device might help a household to buffer health shocks and may render 
MHOs less attractive. Alternatively being a member of a ROSCA may imply some discipline in 
saving which could in turn help an individual in committing to an MHO’s premiums. Concerning 
the health status of the household, 67% of heads reported one of their household members having 
been sick in the previous twelve months. More sickness is likely to lead to greater demand for 
health care and hence for health insurance. 
 
5. STUDY DESIGN 
 
Treatment  was  randomly  assigned  at  the  household  level.  Half  of  the  360  households  were 
invited to attend an insurance literacy module to be held on a non-working day in the city centre 
and held  before our marketing treatment  went  ahead. The module  consisted of a three-hour 
educational presentation offered by the GRAIM on health microinsurance, MHOs functioning 
and a general lesson on personal financial management, savings and the concepts of risk and 
insurance. Sessions were given to groups with a maximum of 20 individuals at a time. GRAIM 
has been running a training program on demand for several years for small communities eager to 
set up their own MHO and so was well placed to run this module. It was thus slightly modified in 
order to be presented to randomly selected households. The same individual was in charge of 
running all the sessions during which interactions with the participants were encouraged. Since 
the city covers a sizable area, we reimbursed transportation costs for all individuals that attended, 
to minimize disincentives to attend. The comparison group of 180 households received nothing. 
This randomization allows us to measure the causal impact of the effect of insurance literacy 
training on the purchase of insurance with MHOs. This way we can assess the module’s impact 
while  screening  out  other  effects  such  as  each  individual’s  inherent  propensity  to  opt  for 
insurance.  
 
Independent of this assignment, the 360 households were split into three randomly chosen sub 
samples  (of  120  households  each)  and  each  subsample  received  an  additional  marketing 
treatment in the form of one of three vouchers. Voucher 2 offered a full refund of membership 
fees in an MHO and voucher 3 a full refund of membership fees plus a refund of 3000FCFA 
covering fees linked to the observation period. Voucher 1 had no monetary value attached to it 
and represented a simple invitation to the GRAIM in case the household was willing to know 
more about MHOs and their insurance product. The recipients had a period of two months to 
redeem the voucher by visiting the GRAIM and filling in an application form to join the MHO of 
their choice. To ensure that our dependent variable was correctly constructed we phoned all 
households who did not redeem their voucher one month after the redemption date to ask them if 
in the meantime they had joined an MHO but not used their voucher. This way we accounted for 
the membership of two additional households.  
 
HERE TABLE 2: randomization across samples  
 
Table 2 shows the tests for random assignments of treatments across samples. Randomization 
with respect to voucher assignment appears satisfactory. However, as can be seen there are a 
number  of  significant  differences  between  the  invited  and  not  invited  samples.  Heads  of 
households that have not been invited to the module are on average richer (smaller proportion in 9 
 
the first quintile of income and larger proportion in the fourth quintile) and wealthier according 
to the number of durables owned. Non-invited individuals also appear to be significantly more 
likely to be employed by a public institution and more knowledgeable about insurance and its 
basic concepts, as their insurance score testifies (a series of seven true or false questions on the 
nature of insurance). Finally, the sub-sample of not invited is significantly more insured against 
health expenditures (through MHOs, IPMs, public employer insurance and private insurance). 
The reason why we observe these significant differences and why our design gave those results 
is unclear to us. We discuss below the potential impact of these differences on our econometric 
results.  
 
6. A FIRST LOOK AT THE EXPERIMENTAL OUTOCOMES 
Table  3  decomposes  the  number  of  uptakers  according  to  our  various  types  of  treatment: 
educational and marketing. One notices that our compliance rate for the educational treatment is 
relatively low with only 105 out of 180 (58%) invited, actually attended the module. It also 
shows that the difference in terms of uptakers between those who attended the insurance literacy 
training and those who did not is negligible (24 versus 17). The table shows that voucher 1 had 
almost no impact on increasing the number of uptakers, with 89 out of 91 new uptakers being 
generated by either voucher 2 or 3. It is also interesting to note that 21 out of 91 uptakers already 
possessed some form of health insurance (11 MHO, 7 IPM and 3 private insurers) indicating that 
MHO membership can complement existing health insurance by covering additional members or 
by topping up existing insurance.  
 
HERE TABLE 3: uptake distribution  
 
7. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION 
 
To access the impact of our two different treatments we use the following model:  
 
M  is  a dummy variable  which takes  the value  one  if the household  subscribes to an MHO 
following one of our treatments. E is a dummy variable which equals one if the household was 
invited to the insurance literacy module. Voucher is a dummy variable which equals one if the 
household was given either voucher 2 or 3. X is a vector of other covariates which contains: 
household  heads’  characteristics  (gender,  education,  income,  and  employment  status),  an 
indicator of household wealth, and two proxies for the status of the household’s health, and the 
household’s level of insurance literacy. The index i  identifies households.  
 
The coefficients of interest are ʱ and ʴ. They respectively measure the effects of attending the 
educational module and of receiving a voucher that alleviates the financial barriers to entry, on 
the probability of  joining an  MHO.  In this  context  E does  not  measure  the effect  of actual 
participation at the educational module, but rather the effect of being invited to attend.  This is 
known as the intention-to-treat effect. We discuss below our results from the average treatment 
effect. 
 
Table 4 shows the results of our estimated OLS model with the marginal effect of covariates on 
the probability of take-up.
 Results obtained with a probit model are similar. Columns 1, 3 and 5 10 
 
show  that  our  dummy  ‘voucher’,  which  takes  the  value  one  if  a  household  receives  either 
voucher 2 or 3, has a significant positive impact on the probability of take-up. This result shows 
that providing financial incentives to households increases the demand for health microinsurance. 
Receiving vouchers 2 or 3 increases the probability of uptake by around 35 percent. As we can 
see in columns 2, 4 and 6 the decomposed effects by vouchers show that voucher 3 has a greater 
and significantly higher impact than that of voucher 2.  
 
HERE TABLE 4: regression output  
 
The intention-to-treat effect of insurance literacy training is not significant. This is surprising 
given that most households we surveyed (70 % of non MHO members) noted that the lack of 
information and knowledge was the reason they had not joined an MHO. This suggests that 
improving insurance literacy in the context of this study would not improve the take-up of health 
microinsurance through an MHO. The related literature provides mixed results on the effect that 
improving financial literacy has on take-up. Cole et al. (2009) find no significant effect (and 
surprisingly negative coefficients) from attending an educational module, on rainfall insurance 
take-up  in  India.  On  the  contrary,  Gaurav  et  al.  (2009)  find  that  their  educational  module 
treatment on a similar product in the state of Gujarat in India improves take-up by 5.3%. With 
data from the same country Giné et al. (2007) emphasize the role of insurance literacy for rainfall 
insurance take-up. Several reasons may explain the lack of a significant effect in our context. 
One could be that contrary to what we write above insurance literacy was already sufficiently 
high  and  that  most  people  in  our  sample  grasp  the  basic  concepts  and  the  need  for  health 
microinsurance. It could also be that the product offered by MHOs is easy enough to understand 
without the need for training. Indeed, the complexity of rainfall insurance marketed by Gaurav et 
al. (2009) makes it more likely to benefit from an insurance literacy module. The quality of the 
educational module could also have had a role. For that matter we did not test participants’ 
financial literacy after their exposure to the module and are thus unable to formally test this. 
However, we know that the person in charge of organizing the module was competent and had 
been running several dozen similar programs over recent years. The interaction term of having 
been invited to the insurance literacy module and having received either voucher 2 or 3 (so the 
variable ‘invited to the module’ times the variable ‘voucher’) is not added in our various models 
simply because of its fully predictive power: no households which were invited to the education 
module and received voucher 1 took up the insurance. 
 
Being educated has no effect on MHO take-up: households whose heads have attended primary 
school, secondary school, or more, are not more likely to join an MHO than those who have 
never attended school. If there is any impact from the education variable it is likely to come 
indirectly through income earned. Results show that earned income is an important determinant 
of take-up and has a positive and significant coefficient. This result is in line with other related 
papers on the determinants of participation to MHOs (notably Jütting, 2003 and Jowett, 2003). 
Poor households from the first income quintile are less likely to take-up MHO insurance than 
richer households. This result reinforces the idea that having enough financial resources helps 
households in joining an MHO and that the poorest are more likely to remain excluded. Once a 
member of an MHO, one has to consistently pay the premium in order to preserve its benefits. 
However, whether a head of household is self employed or works as a public servant, has no 
significant impact (the benchmark group is to be employed by a private firm). This seems to 11 
 
indicate that whether one has an unstable source of income is irrelevant. Male headed households, 
as well as bigger households, are more likely to join MHOs. We also included a dummy variable 
‘already insured’ which takes the value one if the head has health insurance (IPM, MHO or 
private). This variable appears to have no significant impact. This is not surprising if we consider 
the discussion at the end of Section 3. Most IPMs, MHOs and private insurers do not offer full 
coverage for consultation and inpatient care fees and do not cover all members of a household. 
There is thus scope to complement this coverage with that of an MHO. Ahuja et al. (2004) 
suggest that some market imperfections such as credit or borrowing constraints suppress poor 
households’ demand for microinsurance. Related to this we use the dummy ‘saving device’. This 
way we can measure the impact on uptake of having access to financial institutions which can 
offer credit. Our results show that this variable has no significant impact. We also included a 
variable for the willingness to pay (see Bonan, 2011, for an analysis of WTP based on the same 
dataset), for which the results are not shown. It has a significant impact in some of our various 
specifications.  
 
It was expected that more knowledgeable heads of households would be more likely to join an 
MHO. Our results indicate that this is not the case as their insurance score testifies (a series of 
seven true or false questions on the nature of insurance). Finally, in a region prone to various 
chronic  and  recurrent  diseases  such  as  malaria,  it  was  expected  that  households  who  host 
unhealthy members would be more likely to join an MHO. However, the results indicate that 
households who reported recent episode of sickness are not more inclined to join MHOs. This 
tends to indicate that adverse selection is not likely to be an issue in the context of this study. 
 
Two additional dummies were added as controls in our regressions. The first variable takes a 
value of one  if  the household  head is  strongly  risk averse, i.e. always  opted for the certain 
outcome when presented with a set of choices between gambles and certain gains and losses 
using a similar methodology as Voors et al. (2010). In this part of our survey, each individual 
had to choose between certain outcomes (gain/loss of 200, 250 and 300 CFA francs) and simple 
gambles  with  probability  1/4  to  win/lose  1000  CFA  francs  and  probability  3/4  to  win/lose 
nothing. We also ran this exercise with the same amounts multiplied by a factor of ten. Before 
answering this set of 12 questions, each household head was informed that, after completion of 
this section, a lottery would be picked out, amongst the ones offering potential gains, by the 
enumerator who, in accordance with the preference of the player, would either give the certain 
outcome or play the selected lottery for real money. We also turned to the methodology put 
forward in Voors et al. (2010) to elicit discount factors. In this case, household heads had to 
choose, from a list of different amounts to be received in one month, the one  making them 
indifferent from receiving 10000 CFA francs today. The list of amounts used in this question is 
the  following:  10500,  11000,  12500,  15000,  17500,  20000,  25000,  30000,  representing  the 
respective discount factors at one month: 5%, 10%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 100%, 150%, 200%. We 
then generated a binary variable taking a value of one when the individual belonged to the more 
patient  half of our sample.  Both the  risk aversion variable  and the time preference variable 
appear not to significantly influence uptake of our microinsurance product.  
 
Because our compliance rate was not perfect (58% of people invited turned up to the offer of 
insurance literacy training) we also estimate the average treatment effect of insurance literacy on 
the probability of take-up using an IV model. Given that households self select in attending the 12 
 
training session it becomes necessary to correct for such a problem. The random assignment to 
the education module is used as the instrument for attending the module. Results are similar to 
the ones derived with the intention-to-treat effect. The educational module has no effect on take-
up but, on the contrary, vouchers 2 and 3 have a large and significant impact on take-up. 
 
HERE TABLE 5: regression output with interaction terms 
 
Two interesting results can be highlighted from Table 5. We measure the impact of the variable 
voucher for different levels of income by interacting it with income quintiles. Columns 2 and 4 
show that  there is  an additional positive and significant  effect only  for the first  and second 
quintiles. Moreover, column 5 shows that voucher appears to also have an additional positive 
impact for the self-employed. This shows that vouchers 2 and 3 appear to have an additional 
impact  on  poorer  households  and  those  that  are  self-employed  (i.e.  have  no  access  to  IPM 
insurance). Results not shown indicate that no significant effects were found from the interaction 
of income variables with the invitation to the educational module. 
 
(a) Further Discussion 
 
It is possible that our result regarding the insurance literacy treatment is biased by the significant 
differences we highlighted for some variables across samples in Table 2 under the columns ‘not 
invited’ and ‘invited’. Households not invited to attend the insurance literacy training appear to 
be significantly richer, more likely to be employed by a public institution and to have health 
insurance and more knowledgeable about insurance and its basic concepts. However if anything 
these biases would lead to an over-estimation of the effect of the treatment. Our educational 
module is more likely to impact positively on the take-up rate if addressed to less insured and 
knowledgeable  agents.  Thus,  our  finding  which  shows  that  the  educational  module  has  no 
significant impact on take-up rates is likely to hold despite these sample differences.  
 
One puzzling fact to us was that out of the 180 invited households only 105 (58%) attended our 
educational  module. This  despite the fact  that invitations where directly  handed to  heads  of 
household and we followed them up by calling to further advertise the module. We look at the 
determinants  of  attendance  at  our  educational  module  (the  independent  variables  include  all 
control variables from Table 4 except voucher variable) and find that the variables related to 
head’s  employment  type,  income,  household’s  size  and  health  status  are  not  significant. 
Surprisingly, the more knowledgeable a household is of basic insurance principles (the higher 





This paper has looked at the context of health insurance in Thiès. In the absence of universal 
coverage  or  any  credible  public  initiative  to  offer  extensive  health  insurance,  there  exists  a 
supply of health insurance products. We have put particular emphasis on MHOs which are local 
grassroots movements with more than twenty years of community involvement in the region. 
Nevertheless, they remain largely unknown in Thiès. Indeed, our initial findings pointed toward 
the lack of knowledge in explaining the low take-up rates we observed. We devised and offered a 13 
 
customized insurance literacy module communicating the need for and benefits from personal 
health insurance and the functioning of the MHOs to randomly selected households in the city of 
Thiès.  At  the  same  time  we  aimed  at  measuring  the  effect  of  three  cross-cutting  marketing 
treatments using a randomized control trial.  
 
Our  findings  show  that  the  insurance  literacy  module  has  no  significant  impact  on  health 
insurance take-up while our marketing treatments have a large and positive significant impact on 
the households’ purchase decisions. What is striking is that out of the 60 households who were 
invited to the module and received voucher 1 (with no monetary compensation attached) none 
took up the product. What appears from our various descriptive statistics, and results from our 
econometric analysis, is that the crucial element driving new membership is the allocation of 
either voucher 2 or 3. These two vouchers are the only two attached to a monetary compensation. 
Crudely interpreted these results suggest that what really matters is not education but rather 
compensations in the form of reduced fees relating to membership and the period of observation. 
If the state or the city authorities wanted to increase take-up rates the most efficient way would 
be to alleviate the financial barriers to entry. Educating the population about the potential benefit 
of this product is unlikely to produce any significant outcome. We nevertheless remain cautious 
of such results by emphasising that they are based on a relatively small sample. Unfortunately, 
our study does not touch upon the critical issue of membership sustainability over time once 
membership has been acquired. It would be of interest to follow-up on the 91 households who 
redeemed their vouchers and took up health insurance.  
 
Apart  from  the  work  of  GRAIM  which  has  succeeded  in  providing  technical  assistance, 
federating most of the MHOs  in  Thiès,  and in helping them negotiate conventions  with  the 
different health providers, there has been no government led inititative in the region to establish 
new groups or even to help scale-up existing ones. Nevertheless MHOs could represent a unique 
way to reach relatively poor people and informal workers which do not have access to an IPM 
(Poletti  et  al.,  2007).  The  networks  they  represent  in  those  districts  should  be  considered  a 
serious asset. Because they are well established and experienced institutions, they are likely to 
reach underprivileged households at a relatively low cost. What our results also suggest is that 
projects  favouring  the  establishment  of  new  insurance  services,  or  expanding  existing  ones, 
should only require payments of low entry fees if they are to be accessible to the poor. This way 
the neediest could be reached and MHOs would be able to raise the relatively low level of 
participation that we observed.  Increasing membership size could in turn bring positive side 
effects: pooling the risk of more individuals is likely to lead to a reduction in premiums and 
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1. This is not exactly true as there exists an ill-functioning insurance for individuals aged higher 
than 60. Various reports from users and hospital workers have indicated that this programme, 
know as CESAME, is delivering very little results. 
 
2. Out of the 37 households already member: monthly contribution to MHOs amounts to 1.2% of 
the head of household’s income 17 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics 
   Mean  s.d. 
Head is male  0.733  0.443 
Head lives in couple  0.817  0.387 
Head attended  primary school   0.2  0.401 
Head attended  secondary 
school or more  0.461  0.499 
Household size  6.731  3.212 
Already insured  0.325  0.469 
Insurance score   2.250  2.440 
Head is public employed  0.197  0.398 
Head is self employed  0.428  0.495 
Durables  6.597  3.109 
1st Income  quintile  0.211  0.409 
2
nd Income quintile  0.242  0.429 
3rd Income quintile  0.169  0.376 
4
th Income quintile  0.178  0.383 
5
th Income quintile  0.200  0.401 
Saving device  0.569  0.496 
Reported sickness  0.669  0.471 
Strongly risk averse  0.561  0.497 
Patient  0.414  0.493 
N  360    
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Table 2. Random Assignment of Treatments 
   Not Invited  Invited     Voucher 1  Voucher 2  Voucher 3    
   Mean  s.d.  Mean  s.d.  Difference  Mean  s.d.  Mean  s.d.  Mean  s.d.  F-test* 
Head is male  0.750  0.434  0.717  0.452  0.033  0.758  0.430  0.700  0.460  0.748  0.436  0.510 
Head lives in 
couple  0.844  0.363  0.789  0.409  0.056  0.792  0.408  0.825  0.382  0.840  0.368  0.650 
Head attended  
primary school  0.2  0.401  0.2  0.401  0  0.166  0.374  0.215  0.412  0.218  0.415   0.62 
Head attended sec. 
school or more  0.489  0.501  0.433  0.497  0.056  0.517  0.502  0.400  0.492  0.471  0.501  1.560 
Household size  6.533  2.903  6.928  3.490  -0.394  7.100  3.460  6.350  3.143  6.748  3.009  1.610 
Already insured  0.406  0.492  0.244  0.431  0.161**  0.358  0.482  0.300  0.460  0.319  0.468  0.430 
Insurance score   2.550  2.529  1.950  2.317  0.600**  2 417  2 410  2 067  2 445  2 286  2 474  0.570 
Head is public 
employed  0.233  0.424  0.161  0.369  0.072*  0.208  0.408  0.200  0.402  0.185  0.390  0.090 
Head is self 
employed  0.433  0.497  0.422  0.495  0.011  0.425  0.496  0.413  0.494  0.445  0.499   0.13 
Durables  7.078  3.262  6.117  2.878  0.961***  6 717  3 131  6 358  2 961  6 731  3 251  0.530 
1st Income  quintile  0.139  0.347  0.283  0.452  -0.144***  0.208  0.408  0.217  0.414  0.202  0.403  0.150 
2
nd Income quintile  0.244  0.431  0.239  0.428  0.006  0.233  0.425  0.242  0.430  0.244  0.431  0.000 
3rd Income quintile  0.161  0.369  0.178  0.383  -0.017  0.142  0.350  0.167  0.374  0.202  0.403  0.670 
4
th Income quintile  0.222  0.417  0.133  0.341  0.089**  0.217  0.414  0.167  0.374  0.160  0.368  0.730 
5
th Income quintile  0.233  0.424  0.167  0.374  0.067  0.200  0.402  0.208  0.408  0.193  0.397  0.040 
Saving device  0.617  0.488  0.522  0.501  0.094*  0.600  0.492  0.525  0.501  0.588  0.494  0.730 
Reported sickness  0.700  0.460  0.639  0.482  0.061  0.675  0.470  0.658  0.476  0.681  0.468  0.070 
Strongly risk averse  0.567  0.497  0.555  0.498  0.011  0.608  0.490  0.479  0.502  0.596  0.493  2.50* 
Patient  0.383  0.487  0.444  0.498  -0.061  0.391  0.490  0.463  0.501  0.386  0.489  0.90 
N  180     180        120    121    119     19 
 
Table 3. Uptake Distribution across Treatments 
 
N  Number of 
Uptakers (n) 
Take up rate %  (n 
/ N) 
Take up rate %   
(n / 360)  
Already had some form of insurance  117  21  18  6 
MHO members  37  11  30  3 
IPM members  69  7  10  2 
Other forms*  11  3  27  1 
Educational treatment         
Invited to Educational Session  180  41  23  11 
Attendants  105  24  23  7 
of which already insured  27  6  22  2 
Non-Attendants  74  17  23  5 
of which already insured  17  4  24  1 
Not Invited to Educational Session  180  50  28  14 
of which already insured  73  11  15  3 
Marketing treatments         
Voucher 1  120  2  2  1 
of which already insured  43  0  0  0 
Voucher 2  121  38  31  11 
of which already insured  36  8  22  2 
Voucher 3  119  51  43  14 
of which already insured  38  13  34  4 
Voucher 2+3  240  89  37  25 
of which already insured  74  21  28  6 
Whole Sample (#obs)  360  91  25  25 
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Table 4. Determinants of Insurance Take-up 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
VARIABLES  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
             
Invited to the module  -0.0500  -0.0494  -0.0699  -0.0695  -0.0700  -0.0702 
  (0.0424)  (0.0422)  (0.0447)  (0.0446)  (0.0453)  (0.0453) 
Voucher  0.354***    0.361***    0.364***   
  (0.0334)    (0.0346)    (0.0352)   
Gender (Male=1)      0.0984*  0.0940*  0.0973*  0.0941* 
      (0.0517)  (0.0510)  (0.0525)  (0.0516) 
Head attended primary school      -0.0320  -0.0361  -0.0325  -0.0366 
      (0.0619)  (0.0613)  (0.0618)  (0.0613) 
Head attended secondary school or more      -0.0464  -0.0534  -0.0440  -0.0508 
      (0.0616)  (0.0615)  (0.0623)  (0.0622) 
Household size      0.0124*  0.0117*  0.0116*  0.0111* 
      (0.00641)  (0.00646)  (0.00644)  (0.00648) 
Already insured      -0.0902  -0.0899  -0.0947  -0.0932 
      (0.0608)  (0.0599)  (0.0603)  (0.0595) 
Knowledge of insurance principle      0.0142  0.0133  0.0144  0.0134 
      (0.0102)  (0.0103)  (0.0103)  (0.0103) 
Head is public Employed      0.0974  0.101  0.0939  0.0975 
      (0.0662)  (0.0668)  (0.0662)  (0.0668) 
Head is self employed      0.0615  0.0567  0.0632  0.0595 
      (0.0490)  (0.0489)  (0.0500)  (0.0500) 
Durables      0.00533  0.00482  0.00409  0.00371 
      (0.00804)  (0.00804)  (0.00821)  (0.00819) 
1st income quintile      0.232***  0.224***  0.229***  0.223*** 
      (0.0794)  (0.0791)  (0.0795)  (0.0795) 
2nd income quintile      0.241***  0.232***  0.238***  0.231*** 
      (0.0707)  (0.0707)  (0.0709)  (0.0709) 
3rd income quintile      0.189***  0.180**  0.193***  0.184** 
      (0.0710)  (0.0717)  (0.0711)  (0.0719) 
4th income quintile      0.152**  0.151**  0.156**  0.154** 
      (0.0627)  (0.0621)  (0.0631)  (0.0625) 
Saving device      0.0238  0.0197  0.0283  0.0240 
      (0.0510)  (0.0508)  (0.0513)  (0.0511) 
Reported sickness over the year      -0.0404  -0.0402  -0.0368  -0.0372 
      (0.0454)  (0.0453)  (0.0456)  (0.0455) 
Voucher 2    0.298***    0.309***    0.313*** 
    (0.0439)    (0.0452)    (0.0465) 
Voucher 3    0.412***    0.412***    0.412*** 
    (0.0471)    (0.0474)    (0.0476) 
Strongly risk averse          0.0422  0.0331 21 
 
          (0.0438)  (0.0440) 
Impatient          0.00474  0.0106 
          (0.0457)  (0.0456) 
Constant  0.0417  0.0413  -0.316***  -0.290**  -0.335***  -0.308*** 
  (0.0260)  (0.0259)  (0.115)  (0.115)  (0.118)  (0.118) 
             
Observations  360  360  360  360  360  360 
R-squared  0.151  0.162  0.209  0.219  0.212  0.220 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 









Table 5. Determinants of Insurance Take-up 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS  OLS 
           
Invited to the module  -0.0699  -0.0634  -0.0700  -0.0637  -0.0668 
  (0.0447)  (0.0449)  (0.0453)  (0.0455)  (0.0451) 
Voucher  0.361***  0.196***  0.364***  0.199***  0.315*** 
  (0.0346)  (0.0594)  (0.0352)  (0.0603)  (0.0466) 
Gender (Male=1)  0.0984*  0.0943*  0.0973*  0.0930*  0.101* 
  (0.0517)  (0.0519)  (0.0525)  (0.0528)  (0.0523) 
Head attended primary school  -0.0320  -0.0283  -0.0325  -0.0284  -0.0319 
  (0.0619)  (0.0626)  (0.0618)  (0.0626)  (0.0617) 
Head attended secondary school or more  -0.0464  -0.0420  -0.0440  -0.0392  -0.0415 
  (0.0616)  (0.0620)  (0.0623)  (0.0627)  (0.0623) 
Household size  0.0124*  0.0132**  0.0116*  0.0124*  0.0114* 
  (0.00641)  (0.00653)  (0.00644)  (0.00655)  (0.00646) 
Already insured  -0.0902  -0.0952  -0.0947  -0.0999  -0.0908 
  (0.0608)  (0.0613)  (0.0603)  (0.0609)  (0.0606) 
Knowledge of insurance principle  0.0142  0.0147  0.0144  0.0150  0.0145 
  (0.0102)  (0.0104)  (0.0103)  (0.0106)  (0.0103) 
Head is public Employed  0.0974  0.0940  0.0939  0.0904  0.0888 
  (0.0662)  (0.0661)  (0.0662)  (0.0661)  (0.0667) 
Head is self employed  0.0615  0.0635  0.0632  0.0652  -0.0123 
  (0.0490)  (0.0488)  (0.0500)  (0.0498)  (0.0375) 
Durables  0.00533  0.00507  0.00409  0.00389  0.00400 
  (0.00804)  (0.00803)  (0.00821)  (0.00822)  (0.00812) 
1st income quintile  0.232***  0.0596  0.229***  0.0560  0.235*** 
  (0.0794)  (0.0591)  (0.0795)  (0.0600)  (0.0804) 
2nd income quintile  0.241***  0.0633  0.238***  0.0628  0.239*** 
  (0.0707)  (0.0496)  (0.0709)  (0.0500)  (0.0715) 
3rd income quintile  0.189***  0.0883  0.193***  0.0878  0.191*** 
  (0.0710)  (0.0670)  (0.0711)  (0.0685)  (0.0716) 
4th income quintile  0.152**  0.0484  0.156**  0.0564  0.156** 
  (0.0627)  (0.0483)  (0.0631)  (0.0506)  (0.0631) 
1st income quintile * Voucher    0.248**    0.249***   
    (0.0958)    (0.0954)   
2nd income quintile * Voucher    0.262***    0.258***   
    (0.0883)    (0.0890)   
3rd income quintile * Voucher    0.149    0.155   
    (0.117)    (0.118)   
4th income quintile * Voucher    0.153    0.146   
    (0.104)    (0.106)   
Saving device  0.0238  0.0247  0.0283  0.0291  0.0291 23 
 
  (0.0510)  (0.0511)  (0.0513)  (0.0516)  (0.0513) 
Reported sickness over the year  -0.0404  -0.0435  -0.0368  -0.0403  -0.0428 
  (0.0454)  (0.0467)  (0.0456)  (0.0469)  (0.0456) 
Strongly risk averse      0.0422  0.0414  0.0435 
      (0.0438)  (0.0448)  (0.0438) 
Impatient      0.00474  0.00449  0.00441 
      (0.0457)  (0.0461)  (0.0455) 
Head is self employed * Voucher          0.115* 
          (0.0672) 
Constant  -0.316***  -0.209*  -0.335***  -0.227*  -0.306*** 
  (0.115)  (0.113)  (0.118)  (0.117)  (0.116) 
           
Observations  360  360  360  360  360 
R-squared  0.209  0.220  0.212  0.222  0.215 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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